Whither EU Crisis Coordination Post-Lisbon? Blog by Erik Brattberg

The Lisbon Treaty brought several developments to EU crisis management, including the Solidarity Clause. However, it did not significantly alter the Council’s Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), which has yet to be updated to take into account the institutional changes introduced by the Treaty.

In July, a proposal to grant senior EU leaders, such as the Council and Commission Presidents and the new High Representative for foreign and security policy, power to trigger the plan was vetoed by several member states. As a result, the CCA remains a strictly intergovernmental arrangement.

However, this is not likely to serve as a workable arrangement in the future. Member states and the EU should therefore seek to resolve the issue of “ownership” over the CCA, both in terms of who triggers the CCA, and who carries it out.

Established in December 2005 after a growing recognition among member states that the EU lacked a crisis management arrangement for inter-sector coordination at the strategic and high political levels, the CCA was set up to improve coordination during major “transboundary” crises in Europe.

Under the current crisis management procedures, the CCA may be activated by the rotating EU Presidency in the event of an “extremely severe crisis” affecting several member states such as a pandemic outbreak or a major terrorist attack or earthquake.

When activated, the Crisis Steering Group, composed of high-level representatives from the member state holding the rotating Presidency and other affected member states, the Council Secretariat and the Commission, is convened. The purpose of this group is primarily to facilitate coordination between the Commission and the member states’ public communication and crisis management actions at the EU level.

Furthermore, the role of the Commission and the Council consists mostly of “assisting” the Presidency with crisis coordination. In fact, the Council’s role will be even less significant after the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) is transferred to the new External Action Service (EAS).

In order to resolve the issue of “ownership” over the CCA, two issues in particular needs to be addressed. First, clarity of who can trigger the CCA, and why, should be made. Second, measures to get everyone on the board in the event of an activation of the CCA must be explored. The guiding principle should be that everyone participating should be committed to carrying out the CCA’s implications, regardless of who triggered it.

While the exact measures has yet to be fleshed out, it is clear that the current CCA arrangement needs to be revised to take into account post-Lisbon developments.