The recent volcanic ash crisis displays all the characteristics of what we call a “transboundary” crisis, an increasingly common event to arrive on the European continent. Transboundary crises are unique owing to their knock-on effects. They may arrive in one form, but they soon spill over into other forms and take on new guises. Volcanic explosions, sub-prime loans, and communicable diseases are easy to explain in the first instance. What happens next is more difficult to predict, as initial crises trigger secondary effects that spread across geographical, political, and sectoral boundaries.

Transboundary crises place pressure on governments to respond decisively and coherently. Governments of most varieties, however, are not well suited to do so. Responding decisively is difficult because of inherent uncertainties about the crisis and what will happen next. Will the cloud disperse quickly or slowly? It is dangerous or not? Responding coherently is difficult because of how we organise ourselves. Max Weber taught us the value of modelling bureaucracies into specialized units. Yet making policy choices across multiple sectors, simultaneously or sequentially, is difficult within such structures, especially when the pressure is on, information is scarce, and the public spotlight is bright. At such moments, the “coordination reflex” is at its weakest. Different sectors, acting on different information and using different tools, pull away from the centre.

The Commission has few mechanisms to pull together during crises. Inter-sectoral coordination is difficult even in the best of times. As experience shows, two problems are likely to emerge. First, existing coordination mechanisms for crisis management in the Commission (mainly limited to College meetings and a small unit in the Sec Gen) will falter. Founded on the principle of collegiality and based on extended decision-making procedures, such mechanisms are too weak to overcome Commissioners demanding an independent say over decisions, triggering their own policy tools, and interpreting information in conflicting ways. Second, in the event of inaction, the Commission will be outpaced by a (relatively) new player on the crisis management scene: the Council Secretariat. As national officials convene in COSI, the PSC etc. and are serviced by the Sit Cen’s growing crisis capacities (including information tools and decision procedures), the Commission will be left behind to “implement” Council decisions.

The Commission, with its preponderance of crisis tools and duty to uphold the treaties, could take action now towards fleet-footed crisis management – and to avoid relegation. Five areas of concern deserve attention:

I. Political Leadership. Who leads during a crisis? The Commission has thus far avoided this issue out of concern for collective decision-making. Yet the principle of collegiality can be preserved even while clarifying the leadership landscape. Commonly-offered solutions include: allowing the Commission President to take charge, designating a single Commissioner, or designating a group of Commissioners. This is a false choice. Only the Commission President can be pre-designated for crisis leadership. The nature of today’s threats requires flexibility in designating the rest of the “team”, depending on what knock-on effects are likely. (The only other Commissioner with a claim to quasi-permanent membership of a crisis team is Cecilia Malmström, whose portfolio comes nearest to “transboundary” crisis management).

II. Administrative Support. Who supports leaders’ information and implementation needs? Decisions cannot be made in a vacuum, even though the provision of reliable and unbiased information is near impossible during a crisis. Administrative support is required not only to marshal information, but also to filter conflicting analysis. The Commission thus far prioritises sectoral input, yet this information should be coordinated and “enriched” through a central analysis function. The Secretariat-General seems the most logical (and neutral) location for such a function, although more study of this question is required. A related concern is implementation: once decisions are made, they must be carried out (often in the face of administrative opposition). Here, too, some mechanisms to ensure compliance must be created, arguably in the Secretariat-General. 

III. Standard Operating Procedures. What common steps can the Commission agree upon to streamline crisis response? The Council’s Sit Cen operates a Crisis Coordination Arrangement (CCA) based on standard operating procedures, but the Commission’s participation is often slow and uncoordinated. The Commission might consider a set of SOPs within its own house, and to facilitate the Commission’s response to crises. Procedures to be activated during a crisis might include: (i) begin compiling relevant information, (ii) designate ad hoc leadership group, led by the President, (iii) activate analysis function, including College briefings, (iv) designate range of deployable instruments, from both services and agencies, (v) present palette of decision options, (vi) activate public communication strategy, (vii) ensure implementation reporting mechanisms, (viii) revisit decisions and make adjustments. These “political” SOPs should be joined up with any existing “technical” SOPs within the services (which vary widely).

IV. Public Communication. Who speaks for the Commission? The challenges and dilemmas facing communication during crises have been well-described elsewhere.[i] For the Commission, the problem is particularly acute considering the potential for conflict within the College and reluctance from member-states to support Commission communication efforts. Further work must be done to outline the College’s public communication strategies, possibly by identifying and training dedicated operators within the Commission’s services.

V. Lessons Learned and Interim Tasks. What mechanisms exist for effective lesson learning? To date, the Commission has shown scarce willingness to learn lessons, and for understandable reasons: no one enjoys re-examining contentious decisions or re-visiting past battles. Ignoring tough lessons, however, will doom the Commission to reliving the past and undermines the Commission’s potential to think for the long term (unique amongst the EU institutions). Some national governments have found success in “institutionalising” lesson learning exercises after major crises. The College should consider doing the same, from a centralised location. The importance of lesson-learning also points towards the value of preparing for crises before they arrive. Preparatory action, capacity building, training, and crisis management exercises at the highest political levels (even the College) should be a priority, with requisite administrative responsibility for such tasks. These interim actions build capacity to ensure the standard operating procedures (above) work effectively.