The EU, Sweden and Societal Security

By Magnus Ekengren

 

Summary 

In a new article in Vårt Försvar [Our Defence] Ekengren highlights the challenges, opportunities and risks of the EU’s growing responsibility for societal security. The challenge is to build a truly transboundary capacity for the protection of European citizens and society in an environment increasingly characterised by cross-border threats. Ekengren argues that the Union’s opportunity depends on whether the EU member states are able to change their current approach to the EU’s role. Instead of assessing European cooperation as just an ‘added value’ to existing national capacity there is a need to start viewing national resources as adaptable parts of an aggregated European system based on mutual solidarity. He also points out the risk that the current ad hoc creation of EU capacity in the absence of strategy might lead to increased national vulnerability.  

 

The world of crises and disasters is changing rapidly. We are witnessing new types of
adversity. In addition, modern societies have become increasingly vulnerable to disruptions, new and old. This new world demands new types of responses, which nation states cannot produce alone. Nation states will have to cooperate to protect their citizens from these threats. This article investigates the role of the European Union in the development of new safety and security arrangements. It identifies conceptual building blocks for a new security paradigm and offers design principles that can facilitate a shared way of thinking and acting in the safety and security domain.

Published in Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17:4, pp.285-294. Click here to download the article.

The Lisbon Treaty brought several developments to EU crisis management, including the Solidarity Clause. However, it did not significantly alter the Council’s Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), which has yet to be updated to take into account the institutional changes introduced by the Treaty.

In July, a proposal to grant senior EU leaders, such as the Council and Commission Presidents and the new High Representative for foreign and security policy, power to trigger the plan was vetoed by several member states. As a result, the CCA remains a strictly intergovernmental arrangement.

However, this is not likely to serve as a workable arrangement in the future. Member states and the EU should therefore seek to resolve the issue of “ownership” over the CCA, both in terms of who triggers the CCA, and who carries it out.

Established in December 2005 after a growing recognition among member states that the EU lacked a crisis management arrangement for inter-sector coordination at the strategic and high political levels, the CCA was set up to improve coordination during major “transboundary” crises in Europe.

Under the current crisis management procedures, the CCA may be activated by the rotating EU Presidency in the event of an “extremely severe crisis” affecting several member states such as a pandemic outbreak or a major terrorist attack or earthquake.

When activated, the Crisis Steering Group, composed of high-level representatives from the member state holding the rotating Presidency and other affected member states, the Council Secretariat and the Commission, is convened. The purpose of this group is primarily to facilitate coordination between the Commission and the member states’ public communication and crisis management actions at the EU level.

Furthermore, the role of the Commission and the Council consists mostly of “assisting” the Presidency with crisis coordination. In fact, the Council’s role will be even less significant after the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) is transferred to the new External Action Service (EAS).

In order to resolve the issue of “ownership” over the CCA, two issues in particular needs to be addressed. First, clarity of who can trigger the CCA, and why, should be made. Second, measures to get everyone on the board in the event of an activation of the CCA must be explored. The guiding principle should be that everyone participating should be committed to carrying out the CCA’s implications, regardless of who triggered it.

While the exact measures has yet to be fleshed out, it is clear that the current CCA arrangement needs to be revised to take into account post-Lisbon developments.

The remarkable increase in European security and defence integration in the past decade has resented a challenge to traditional integration theories. Although they remain relevant, these heories fail to take full account of the changing security architecture of Europe, which includes he rise of transgovernmental networks (TGNs). With a focus on EU civil protection, this article ritically examines established definitions of TGNs and investigates how these networks influence he supranational and national levels of security cooperation. Findings point toward the emergence of an alternative form of European security governance that addresses the lack of authority in EU ecurity policy.

Published in Cooperation and Conflict, 45(3) 312–330, SAGE Publications. Access the article here

Mark Rhinard is interviewed about the European terrorist threat on National Public Radio (NPR) Hourly News , 4 October 2010. Click here to listen to the broadcast.

With the anniversary of 9/11 still fresh in people’s minds, this EPC issue paper discusses the EU’s role in counter-terrorism abroad in five countries with an insecure security system, discovers common shortcomings and suggests measures for improvements.

The anniversary of 9/11 has once again raised public interest in reducing terrorist threats and the gentle beginnings of the EU’s European External Action Service make this a pertinent time to assess the EU’s record in fighting terrorism abroad. This new EPC issue paper by Peter Wennerholm, Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard assesses the efficacy of EU tools to do so, and suggests how they could be improved in a post-Lisbon institutional set-up.

The study tracks the use and efficacy of the EU’s resources in five countries which are a potential breeding ground for terrorists: Algeria, Morocco, Yemen, Pakistan and Indonesia. It reveals four common weaknesses: third countries’ receptiveness to EU support, EU Member States’ (un)willingness to cooperate, the lack of coordination between EU institutions and delegations, and the international community’s inability to meld its activities.

Mark Rhinard, one of the report’s authors said about the findings: “We need to take stock of the EU’s effectiveness in fighting terrorism, and playing a more generally-constructive role on the world stage. With the institutional environment of EU external policy-making in flux, the time is ripe to implement reforms and meaningful changes before new EU roles are defined and policies put in place.”

Building security at home and abroad

The paper outlines the major steps that the three key actors need to take to prevent the growth of terrorist activities or groups in instable countries:  

National governments: Take other EU Member States’ priorities into account when setting international counter-terrorism assistance. Develop shared metrics for evaluating ‘success’ in third countries and give EU institutions a bigger role in identifying gaps and overlaps. 

 EU institutions: Improve monitoring of EU governments’ counter-terrorism efforts and encourage them to share ‘best practice’. Clarify the High Representative/Vice President’s role and strengthen EU delegations in the field’s counter-terrorist activity. Boost the Council’s Working Party on the International Aspects of Terrorism.

Cooperation with the international community: Prioritise regional coordination. Work closely with assistance target countries to improve their ‘absorption capacity’. Focus more on UN Resolution 1373, the global framework for counter-terrorism and work closely with the UN’s Committee on Counter-Terrorism.

Access the publication here

In the wake of severe climatic events and terrorist acts and the emergence of dangerous technologies, communities, nations, and global organizations have diligently sought to create strategies to prepare for such events. Designing Resilience presents case studies of extreme events and analyzes the ability of affected individuals, institutions, governments, and technological systems to cope with disaster.

This volume defines resilience as it relates to disaster management at specific stages: mitigation, prevention, preparation, and response and recovery. The book illustrates models by which to evaluate resilience at levels ranging from individuals to NGOs to governmental jurisdictions and examines how resilience can be developed and sustained. A group’s or nation’s ability to withstand events and emerge from them with their central institutions intact is at the core of resilience. Quality of response, capacity to improvise, coordination, flexibility, and endurance are also determinants. Individual case studies, including Hurricane Katrina in the United States, the London bombings, and French preparedness for the Avian flu, demonstrate effective and ineffective strategies. The contributors reveal how the complexity and global interconnectivity of modern systems-whether they are governments, mobile populations, power grids, financial systems, or the Internet-have transcended borders and created a new level of exposure that has made them especially vulnerable to extreme events. Yet these far-reaching global systems also possess the ability to alert and respond at greater speeds than ever before. The authors also analyze specific characteristics of resilient systems-the qualities they possess and how they become resilient-to determine if there are ways to build a system of resilience from the ground up.

As such, Designing Resilience will inform a broad range of students and scholars in areas of public administration, public policy, and the social sciences.

For more information, see: http://www.upress.pitt.edu/BookDetails.aspx?bookId=36086

In the EU’s rush to implement the Lisbon Treaty, little attention has been paid to the ‘Solidarity Clause’, now enshrined as Article 222 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This one-page provision creates one of the most explicit demands upon EU members to act jointly and to assist one another in the face of disasters, emergencies, and crises on the European continent. Yet the precise meaning of this demand, and its implications for EU institutions and member states, has yet to be fully assessed.

So far the notion of EU solidarity and mutual assistance has meant different things to different people (and governments). As long as solidarity remained a rhetorical device in the EU context, such differences could be tolerated. Now that solidarity has been established as a legal concept through the Solidarity Clause, such differences need to be reconciled.

In a recent paper published by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, we studied the meaning of the Solidarity Clause at a timely moment in its development. Not only are the complexities of modern crises becoming increasingly apparent (think of the volcanic ash crisis, H1N1 or large-scale natural disasters) but the political-administrative machinery to support the Solidarity Clause is now being put in place. A proposal is due from the European Commission in the upcoming months, and an opportunity will emerge to ‘frame’ the Clause in a way that is consistent with its original intent. The task thus facing European and national policymakers is to flesh out details regarding the commitments embedded in the Clause. Ignoring those commitments, or assuming that the Clause will never be triggered, may prove to be a dangerous strategy informed by wishful thinking.

In our paper we offer an interpretation of the Clause. We start out by detailing its history and positioning it against the backdrop of other solidarity obligations in Europe. We then provide details on the content of the Clause and outline seven questions regarding its implementation. We conclude the paper with two sections, providing an overview of recent developments and then offering recommendations for policymakers.

Briefly put, our recommendations encourage policymakers to take a short‐term, medium‐term, and long‐term view of the Solidarity Clause. The short‐term view focuses on the upcoming ‘implementation arrangements’ and the need to clarify the position and role of the Clause vis‐à‐vis other existing instruments in the EU. The medium‐term examines situations in which the Clause might be ‘triggered’ and considers national readiness to provide solidarity to others. The long‐term view widens the perspective to the development of the Solidarity Clause over time, not only as a sign‐post in the inexorable journey towards ‘Europeanised’ crisis cooperation but also as a spur to thinking about solidarity obligations more broadly. The readers are reminded of the fact that the policy choices made today will have a lasting impact on whether the EU will develop into an efficient crisis manager in the face of increasingly complex risks and threats.

Access the full paper here: The European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or Effective Tool?

The recent volcanic ash crisis displays all the characteristics of what we call a “transboundary” crisis, an increasingly common event to arrive on the European continent. Transboundary crises are unique owing to their knock-on effects. They may arrive in one form, but they soon spill over into other forms and take on new guises. Volcanic explosions, sub-prime loans, and communicable diseases are easy to explain in the first instance. What happens next is more difficult to predict, as initial crises trigger secondary effects that spread across geographical, political, and sectoral boundaries.

Transboundary crises place pressure on governments to respond decisively and coherently. Governments of most varieties, however, are not well suited to do so. Responding decisively is difficult because of inherent uncertainties about the crisis and what will happen next. Will the cloud disperse quickly or slowly? It is dangerous or not? Responding coherently is difficult because of how we organise ourselves. Max Weber taught us the value of modelling bureaucracies into specialized units. Yet making policy choices across multiple sectors, simultaneously or sequentially, is difficult within such structures, especially when the pressure is on, information is scarce, and the public spotlight is bright. At such moments, the “coordination reflex” is at its weakest. Different sectors, acting on different information and using different tools, pull away from the centre.

The Commission has few mechanisms to pull together during crises. Inter-sectoral coordination is difficult even in the best of times. As experience shows, two problems are likely to emerge. First, existing coordination mechanisms for crisis management in the Commission (mainly limited to College meetings and a small unit in the Sec Gen) will falter. Founded on the principle of collegiality and based on extended decision-making procedures, such mechanisms are too weak to overcome Commissioners demanding an independent say over decisions, triggering their own policy tools, and interpreting information in conflicting ways. Second, in the event of inaction, the Commission will be outpaced by a (relatively) new player on the crisis management scene: the Council Secretariat. As national officials convene in COSI, the PSC etc. and are serviced by the Sit Cen’s growing crisis capacities (including information tools and decision procedures), the Commission will be left behind to “implement” Council decisions.

The Commission, with its preponderance of crisis tools and duty to uphold the treaties, could take action now towards fleet-footed crisis management – and to avoid relegation. Five areas of concern deserve attention:

I. Political Leadership. Who leads during a crisis? The Commission has thus far avoided this issue out of concern for collective decision-making. Yet the principle of collegiality can be preserved even while clarifying the leadership landscape. Commonly-offered solutions include: allowing the Commission President to take charge, designating a single Commissioner, or designating a group of Commissioners. This is a false choice. Only the Commission President can be pre-designated for crisis leadership. The nature of today’s threats requires flexibility in designating the rest of the “team”, depending on what knock-on effects are likely. (The only other Commissioner with a claim to quasi-permanent membership of a crisis team is Cecilia Malmström, whose portfolio comes nearest to “transboundary” crisis management).

II. Administrative Support. Who supports leaders’ information and implementation needs? Decisions cannot be made in a vacuum, even though the provision of reliable and unbiased information is near impossible during a crisis. Administrative support is required not only to marshal information, but also to filter conflicting analysis. The Commission thus far prioritises sectoral input, yet this information should be coordinated and “enriched” through a central analysis function. The Secretariat-General seems the most logical (and neutral) location for such a function, although more study of this question is required. A related concern is implementation: once decisions are made, they must be carried out (often in the face of administrative opposition). Here, too, some mechanisms to ensure compliance must be created, arguably in the Secretariat-General. 

III. Standard Operating Procedures. What common steps can the Commission agree upon to streamline crisis response? The Council’s Sit Cen operates a Crisis Coordination Arrangement (CCA) based on standard operating procedures, but the Commission’s participation is often slow and uncoordinated. The Commission might consider a set of SOPs within its own house, and to facilitate the Commission’s response to crises. Procedures to be activated during a crisis might include: (i) begin compiling relevant information, (ii) designate ad hoc leadership group, led by the President, (iii) activate analysis function, including College briefings, (iv) designate range of deployable instruments, from both services and agencies, (v) present palette of decision options, (vi) activate public communication strategy, (vii) ensure implementation reporting mechanisms, (viii) revisit decisions and make adjustments. These “political” SOPs should be joined up with any existing “technical” SOPs within the services (which vary widely).

IV. Public Communication. Who speaks for the Commission? The challenges and dilemmas facing communication during crises have been well-described elsewhere.[i] For the Commission, the problem is particularly acute considering the potential for conflict within the College and reluctance from member-states to support Commission communication efforts. Further work must be done to outline the College’s public communication strategies, possibly by identifying and training dedicated operators within the Commission’s services.

V. Lessons Learned and Interim Tasks. What mechanisms exist for effective lesson learning? To date, the Commission has shown scarce willingness to learn lessons, and for understandable reasons: no one enjoys re-examining contentious decisions or re-visiting past battles. Ignoring tough lessons, however, will doom the Commission to reliving the past and undermines the Commission’s potential to think for the long term (unique amongst the EU institutions). Some national governments have found success in “institutionalising” lesson learning exercises after major crises. The College should consider doing the same, from a centralised location. The importance of lesson-learning also points towards the value of preparing for crises before they arrive. Preparatory action, capacity building, training, and crisis management exercises at the highest political levels (even the College) should be a priority, with requisite administrative responsibility for such tasks. These interim actions build capacity to ensure the standard operating procedures (above) work effectively.

Are EU members prepared to provide solidarity in the face of crises? What should European solidarity look like in practice? How can this be achieved? These questions formed the basis for discussion at this seminar where a new report by Mark Rhinard and Sara Myrdal on the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 222 (TFEU) was presented.

Acccess the report here: “European Solidarity in Sight?”